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THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DICHOTOMY: POLITICAL
DISAGREEMENT AND ACADEMIC REPUDIATION
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN t
The distinction between public and private connects with a
central tenet of liberal thought: the insistence that because indi-
viduals have rights, there are limits on the power of government
vis-a-vis the individual. Public and private are the descriptive
labels I will use in this essay to distinguish spheres or clusters of
activities that are presumptively outside the legitimate bounds of
government coercion and regulation (the private sphere) from those
where government has a legitimate role (the public sphere).
At the outset, I should make clear that this dichotomy does not
imply that attaching the label "private" to an activity signifies that
government has no legitimate role, or that the characterizing of a
realm as "public" means that anything goes. In the private sphere,
some sort of legal framework and state involvement is often essen-
tial, if only to inhibit force and fraud and enforce contracts. None-
theless, under the terminology proposed here, the label "private"
would carry with it a strong presumption that it is not legitimate
for the government to be paternalistic or highly regulatory. It con-
notes, to use Justice Marshall's language, "a sphere of private au-
tonomy which government is bound to respect." 1 In the public
sphere, there would be no such presumption. This does not mean,
of course, that in the public realm any governmental action is ap-
propriate. Not all of an individual's rights are encompassed in the
private sphere. Indeed, most civil rights have to do with an indi-
vidual's participation as a citizen in public activities relating to
governance, whether as political pamphleteer, voter, or speechmaker.
Given these definitions, the dichotomy between public and
private can bring into focus two questions central to political theory
and moral philosophy: (1) Should certain activities be considered
"private," and thus at least presumptively beyond the legitimate
sphere of regulatory, paternalistic governmental power? (2) If so,
what activities should be considered "private" and why? I pose
these questions not with the expectation of answering them. In-
f Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B. 1964, LL.B. 1968, Harvard
University. This essay was written while I was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced
Study in the Behavioral Sciences.
1PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall,
J., concurring).
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stead, I will describe and contrast the answers to these questions
offered by those on the contemporary scene in American political
life with the answers implicit in American legal scholarship-at
least as evidenced by papers presented at this symposium.
I.
Let's start with the political scene at large. It appears to me
that across a broad political spectrum there is a consensus that the
power of government should be bounded and that certain "private"
activities should be presumptively beyond the bounds of legitimate
government regulation or coercion. Put another way, I suspect that
most liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans share a com-
mitment to the idea of private as I have defined the term. The
rub comes with the second question, however. What are the dimen-
sions of the private realm? There appears to be no similar con-
sensus about what activities should be considered private. Indeed,
the very activities that are labeled private by liberal Democrats are
considered public by conservative Republicans, and vice versa.
These differences can be dramatically exposed by asking for the
dimensions of the "public" and the "private" spheres in the realm
of sexual expression and in the pursuit of economic goods.
Liberal Democrats would certainly attach the label "private"
to a broad range of sexual activities involving consenting adults.
They oppose attempts to regulate or withhold access to contracep-
tives or abortions. They disfavor the use of law, especially criminal
law, to channel sexual activities exclusively into marriage, and to
enforce sexual fidelity. They favor the repeal of those remaining
statutes prohibiting consensual nonmarital sex or private consensual
homosexual acts. They have pressed to "deregulate" marriage,
arguing that individuals should be free to choose whether to marry,
and what the terms of the marriage should be. They want to blur
or eliminate the legal differences between marriage and cohabita-
tion, and have pressed to extend legal protection to cohabitants,
particularly to those who have made cohabitation agreements. In
short, liberal Democrats would characterize a broad range of activi-
ties concerning sexuality and marriage as "private." They argue
that in this sphere the state should facilitate private ordering and
avoid regulation, especially regulation based on moralistic or pater-
nalistic grounds.
Conservative Republicans do not view this realm as "private"
and instead favor legal regulation. The family is a primary social
institution, and conservatives tend to see it as entirely appropriate
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to ,use the legal system to impose the ideal of a monogamous, .hetero-
sexual marriage. Family stability is considered indispensable for
the stability of society and civilization. Strict laws are endorsed
because they can possibly deter marriage break-ups and protect
children. Deterrence aside, such laws are seen as appropriate affirma-
tions of fundamental social values and are also said to be necessary
for the protection of the individuals involved.
With respect to economic activity, liberal Democrats and con-
servative Republicans swap positions. Conservatives emphasize the
importance of private property, and see the market as an institution
that appropriately rewards talent and contributes to economic effi-
ciency. Various governmental programs to redistribute economic
resources are generally disfavored as interfering with private enter-
prise. State interference with "free" consumer choice in the market-
place is opposed. Conservatives view government interference with
dominion over what has been acquired through the market as sus-
pect if not illegitimate, favoring strong legal protection for private
property. Regulations to guard against occupational hazards or to
protect consumers from their own "ignorance" are seen as paternal-
istic, and are generally opposed. Conservatives generally disfavor
minimum wage laws and environmental regulations.
Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, view the economic sphere
as quintessentially public. Progeny of the New Deal, they have
limited faith in a market economy and are fundamentally suspicious
of the distribution of resources it brings about. Government is seen
as having affirmative obligations: (1) to protect consumers and the
environment from exploitation by business interests; (2) to use tax
policies and welfare policies to redistribute economic resources in
favor of the less fortunate; and (3) to promote economic activity
through macroeconomic policy. While most would not favor
centralized planning or government ownership of the primary means
of production, liberal Democrats are what Ronald Dworkin has
called "reluctant capitalists" 2-they view active government inter-
vention as essential to maintaining their faith in the marketplace.
It is worth noting that at times both the right and the left
have been reluctant to trust the legislature with the task of defining
the dimensions of these spheres. This is consistent, of course, with
familiar arguments that legislative intrusion into the private realm
may offend rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Such fears are
easy to understand. The conservative perhaps suspects that an
envious majority may be tempted to,"soak the rich" and adopt pro-
. -2Dworkin, Liberalism, in Pu~c AND PiV ATz MonA=m 133 (S. Hampshire
ed. 1978).
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tective legislation that interferes with the "free" pursuit of economic
liberty. The liberal Democrat, on the other hand, fears that a
rabid and moralistic minority may succeed in pressuring a timorous
legislature to maintain or readopt restrictive laws that ratify sexual
orthodoxy. The federal courts have been responsive to each, al-
though at different times. During the four decades before 1937
the Supreme Court expressed solicitude for private property and
freedom of contract and erected a now dismantled constitutional
bulwark against attempts to regulate the economic sphere. And
during the last sixteen years, the Court has used judicial powers
once again to demarcate a private realm, this time in connection
with contraception and abortion.
Notwithstanding the 1980 elections, the trends of the last fifty
years-both legislative and judicial-certainly suggest that the eco-
nomic realm has generally come to be seen as more public, while
the sphere of activities centering around intimate association is
viewed as more private. In 1937, the Supreme Court abandoned
the economic realm to the legislature.3 Since 1930, the share of
GNP represented by the local, state, and federal governments has
increased dramatically-today it represents about one fifth.4  The
explosive increase since World War II in the size and power of the
Washington, D.C., bar6 perhaps best symbolizes the increase in
the importance of the government in the economy and the degree
of economic regulation of one sort or another.
During the same period, the deregulation of marriage and
sexual activities has been at least as striking. Until recently, mar-
riage and divorce laws attempted to restrict private ordering severely.
Substantial limitations were imposed on the power of parties to
enter into prenuptial or nuptial agreements. Divorce was granted
only after an official inquiry by a judge, who had to determine
whether "appropriate grounds"-very narrowly defined in terms of
marital offenses-existed. When a divorce was granted, the state
asserted broad authority to structure the economic relationship of
the spouses and to maintain regulatory jurisdiction over the children
and their relationship to their parents. 6 In 1965, no state permitted
3 See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
4 Total Output, Income and Spending, EcoN. INDICAToRs, Jan. 1982, at "1.
GNP in the fourth quarter of 1981 was $2984.9 billion. Total government pur-
chases of goods and services (federal, state, and local) were $615.7 billion, or
about one fifth (20%). Id.
5 See LEGAL Tmms, June 9, 1980, at 26-29. Between June, 1979, and June,
1980, 20 new firms opened offies in Washington.
6 Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 952-53 (1979).
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no-fault divorce upon the petition of one spouse. As of August 1,
1980, only two states still limited divorce to traditional "fault"
grounds.7  Today no state can outlaw the distribution of contra-
ceptives 8 or prohibit first-trimester abortions.9 Nonetheless, a com-
parison of the platforms of the two national political parties in
1980,10 the results of that presidential election, the continuing con-
troversies concerning abortion, homosexual rights, and the Equal
Rights Amendment, and signs of some revival of religious commit-
ment, caution against confident extrapolation of past trends into
the future.
Without trying to guess how public and private will be defined
in the future, or whether any distinction will remain viable, it is
interesting to ask why political values are clustered as they are.
What lies behind each side's categorizations? What is the historical
foundation for each and how deep is it? Does either cluster repre-
sent a stable basis for predicting the shape of American politics in
the coming decade?
These contrasting clusters of values also raise fascinating issues
at the level of political philosophy. Does it make sense to think
there is a shared commitment to the liberal ideal of a private realm,
when political opponents each pour such different content into the
concept? Are either (or both) of these contrasting clusters intel-
lectually coherent? Or does the contemporary conservative position
represent nothing more than the illegitimate, and now aging, off-
spring of a union between John Calvin's morality and Adam Smith's
economics? Is the liberal Democrat guided by an inconsistent
vision that blends together in equal measure the teachings of John
Stuart Mill, Hubert Humphrey, and Alex Comfort? Are each
guilty, as Daniel Bell suggests, of applying a "double standard"? 11
In thinking about these issues, I find Ronald Dworkin's dis-
cussion of contemporary conservatives and liberals both helpful and
suggestive. He posits that conservatives hold a particular concept
7 See State Divorce Law Chart, [Reference File] FAr. L. PEzr. (BNA) 400ii
(July 20, 1982). The two states are Illinois and South Dakota.
8 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
9 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10 Republicans called for the appointment of anti-abortion federal judges,
and opposed passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. Democrats emphasized full
employment and job creation, while Republicans promised tax cuts, increased arms
spending, and a balanced budget. The Democratic and Republican party platforms
are summarized in N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1980, at B4, col. 1 and July 16, 1980, at
Al, col. 3.
1iD. BELL, THE CULTURAL CoNTRADIcGinONs o C irAInIsm 275 (1976).
Bell observes that the right wants economic freedom, but moral regulation, while
contemporary liberals "want economic regulation and moral freedom." Id.
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of virtue. For them, it is appropriate to use the "processes of legis-
lation to reaffirm, as a community, its public conception of vir-
tue." 12 Freedom in the economic marketplace, on the other hand,
is defended for both instrumental and deontological grounds. Ac-
cording to conservatives, not only does the market most efficiently
produce the appropriate bundle of goods and services, it also achieves
distributional fairness by assigning "greater rewards to those who,
because they have the virtues of talented industry, supply more of
what is wanted by the other members of the virtuous society." 13
The liberal, according to Dworkin, rejects the notion that it is
appropriate to legislate preferences concerning sexual behavior into
public morality. Instead, the state should be neutral with respect
to the content of the good life. The liberal is committed to an
idea of equality that requires active government intervention in
the marketplace, while leaving decisions about what should be pro-
duced in private hands. The liberal also combines a belief in
political democracy with a view of rights that serve as "trump
cards." 14
II.
Now let me turn to the symposium papers themselves as repre-
sentatives of current legal scholarship and ask the same two ques-
tions: (1) Should there be a distinction between a private sphere,
where presumptively the state should not regulate but instead main-
tain a laissez-faire attitude, and a public sphere where there is no
such presumption? And (2), if so, what are the appropriate dimen-
sions of the private and public realms? My thesis is straightforward.
Unlike the world of American politics, where I see a consensus that
the first question should be answered "yes," while the disagreement
is at the second level, in the contemporary world of legal scholar-
ship, the necessity of public/private dichotomy itself is being chal-
lenged. From the papers prepared for this symposium, it seems
that these challenges come from very different directions.
Scholars in law and economics are implicitly challenging the
dichotomy, notwithstanding the fact that the lawyer-economists are
usually seen as champions of the liberal faith, particularly by "criti-
cal legal scholars." Professor Ellickson's paper 15 comparing cities
12 Dworkin, supra note 2, at 137.
13 Id. 136.
14 Id.
15 Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1511
(1982).
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with "private" intermediaries,, especially homeowners associations,
exemplifies this challenge. Ellickson finds that homeowners asso-
ciations, which are considered "private," look very much like cities,
which are "public." For both entities, Ellickson asks what set of
voting rules and standards of judicial reyiew can best deal with the
possibility of a majority adopting redistributive policies that dis-
advantage a "captive" minority.
Ellickson suggests that the, disparities in, legal treatment of
these public and private entities should be reduced in two impor-
tant respects: (1) Homeowners associations, like cities, should be
subject to "taking clauses." (2) Cities, like homeowners associations,
should have great flexibility in allocating voting power to reflect
the economic stakes in local policies.' 6 In the concluding part of his
paper, Professor Ellickson suggests that there is, no reason a priori
to favor or disfavor "public" intermediaries as compared to "pri-
vate" intermediaries, such as ordinary corporations. He disagrees
with Professor Frug that cities are in fact "powerless" or disadvan-
taged when compared to private intermediaries. While Frug pro-
poses a coalition to press for the reforms necessary to place cities
on the same legal footing as private intermediaries, Ellickson will
join in pushing for expansion of city business powers only if Frug
supports reforms to remove existing tax subsidies for cities.
I suspect that when Professor Ellickson began thinking about
these issues he did not intend to obliterate the distinction between
public and private. His own analysis simply led him to policy
conclusions that a sharp dichotomy makes little sense in this con-
text. Nonetheless, I think the mode of analysis used by lawyer-
economists (myself included) systematically pushes in the direction
of making the public/private distinction unimportant. Let me
briefly explain why.,
Lawyer-economists view legal rules and procedures as policy
instruments. To use philosophical jargon, they are consequential-
ists-they evaluate alternatives by comparing consequences. Con-
cerned with the consequences of alternative legal rules, they find
the distinction between public and private irrelevant. Legal rules
may potentially affect behavior in any realm of human life: in
16 He does not suggest that there are no relevant differences between cities
and homeowners associations. Because homeowners associations (unlike cities) can
have no involuntary members when formed, Ellicks6n concludes that courts should
view with suspicion amendments to. the original governing documents (because
the change may represent an ex post attempt to change the rules to redistribute
coercively), but should give deference to the original documents themselves (be-
cause the market price will appropriately reflect the ex ante risks of redistribution,
thus creating an appropriate incentive for the developer). See id. 1526-27.
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comparing alternative legal rules, the consequences are what count,
no matter what the "sphere."
This limited analytical perspective, while often noted, is not
usually the focus of the attack on the law and economics approach
by critical legal scholars. These critics more often challenge what
they see as the implicit or explicit values used by lawyer-economists
to evaluate and compare the consequences of alternative policies.
They perceive a bias in favor of "efficiency" as opposed to fair dis-
tribution. Sophisticated critics also attack the use of individual
preferences as the basis for choice. They point out that economics
has no theory to explain how preferences are generated or changed.
They challenge the individualistic bias of economic thought, and
the assumption that existing individual preferences can be taken as
given, or exogenous.
Certainly, such critics usually place economic analysis in the
liberal tradition because it is individualistic and market-oriented.
But for my purposes, at least, the more striking feature of the
approach of lawyer-economists is not liberal-in the sense in which
I am using the word-because they do not allow for a private sphere,
presumptively beyond the legitimate range of coercive state power.
Everything is up for grabs-it all turns on how the policy analysis
comes out in terms of consequences. Presumably, if the expected
consequences of allocating voting power only to property owners
were "preferable" to alternatives by some measure of social utility,
then that scheme would be the optimum policy. Similarly, the
decision whether consensual homosexual activity should be decrimi-
nalized, or whether government should impose a minimum wage
does not turn on the characterization of the realm of activity.
There are no deontological rights that make it illegitimate for
government to adopt particular sorts of legal rules.
If Ellickson's challenge to the public/private dichotomy is im-
plicit, Professor Karl Klare's certainly is not.1'7 It is not surprising
that Klare, who associates himself with the critical legal studies
movement, attacks the dichotomy, because the one unifying tenet
of this group is a commitment to showing the contradictions of
liberal thought. Professor Klare denies the legitimacy of searching
for a sphere of activities defined as being "private" and thus beyond
the state's power. For Klare, it seems there is no such thing as
"private." All is public because it is impossible to conceive of
social and economic life apart from government and law. Seeing
17See Iare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 1358 (1982).
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the public/private distinction as part of the intellectual apparatus
of liberal thought, Klare believes public/private rhetoric tends to
"channel democratic aspirations into the framework of individual-
istic rights" 18 and acts as a cover used to justify "class hierarchy
and domination." 19 Posing as "an analytical tool," the public/
private distinction "functions more as a form of political rhetoric
used to justify particular results"; 20 to justify "the private appro-
priation of socially-created wealth"; 21 "to sanction private control
of investment in resource-allocation decisions of societal conse-
quence, and generally to legitimize the 'free' market as an institu-
tion." 2 Klare does more than suggest that the "rise of the regula-
tory state" and the "primacy of vast corporate entities" 23 constantly
erode the meaningfulness of the distinction. His more general
thesis is that "the social function of the public/private distinction
is to repress aspirations for alternative political arrangements." 24
I am curious whether Professor Klare's disdain for the dis-
tinction between public and private extends to the sphere of inti-
mate relations. Should individuals have substantive rights that can
shield their consensual sexual conduct from government regulation?
Which private economic interests "captured" state power to de-
regulate divorce law, to decriminalize contraception and abortion,
and in about fifteen states, consensual homosexual activity as well?
Has the result of these changes been to perpetuate class domination
and inequality in social life? If he approves of these changes, as I
suspect he does, then is his critique of the dichotomy limited to its
application in the sphere of economic regulation in general, and
labor law in particular? Or does he think it is equally meaningless
and contradictory to insist on a private realm with respect to con-
sensual sexual relations?
Professor Klare's discussion of benShalom v. Secretary of the
Army 25 comes close to suggesting that the public/private distinc-
tion is equally meaningless in the sphere of intimate relations. The
district court in that case ordered the reinstatement of an Army
18 Id. 1419.
19 Clare, Preliminary Memorandum for The Public/Private Distinction in Labor
Law, supra note 17, at 2 (Dec. 29, 1981) (on file at University of Pennsylvania
Law Review).
20 Mare, supra note 17, at 1361.
2 1 Kare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective
Bargaining Law, 4 IwDus. REL. L.J. 450, 456 n.19 (1981).
22 Id.
23 Id.
2 4 Mare, supra note 17, at 1361.
25 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
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reservist who had been discharged because she was a homosexual.
Kare applauds the benShalom holding as "visionary." 26 However,
he would plainly prefer to base the result not on the need to prd-
tect an individual's "privacy" from public intrusion, but instead
on a right of the public to a "sexually pluralistic environment." 27
What is ambiguous, however, is whether his proposed "public right"
would be the entire foundation or would instead simply. supple-
ment an individual's privacy right. He writes: "Ideally, the law
should not only create zones of privacy and protect victimized em-
ployees, but it should also recognize a public right of employees to
work in a sexually pluralistic environment." 28 Beneath this am-
biguity lurks a troubling dilemma for Klare. On the one hand,
any reliance on an individual's right to personal privacy seems in-
consistent with Klare's total rejection of the public/private distinc-
tion. On the other hand, a complete reliance on his undefined
"public right" hardly offers much protection for sexual autonomy.
What limits are there to Klare's proposed "public right ... to work
in a sexually pluralistic environment," and who defines those limits?
Can a majority force an individual to change her sexual orientation
in order to make the environment more pluralistic? Conversely,
can the "public" restrain consensual sexual relations when a major-
ity thinks there is "enough" sexual pluralism? Klare's "public right"
approach leads to contradictions and indeterminacies of just the
sort that he condemns.
Professor Brest's approach 2 9 is different from that of Professor
Klare-he does not argue that the state action doctrine is simply a
veil used by industrialists to dominate the proletariat. But he ap-
pears to share Professor Klare's view that there can be no funda-
mental distinction between government and private action. The
implication of his article is that there can be no "private" sphere
that should presumptively be beyond the reach of policy and
politics.
Professor Brest's immediate target is Justice Rehnquist's brand
of constitutional interpretation as revealed in Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks.30 He examines Rehnquist's attempt to define state action
for the purpose of distinguishing a public sphere (where due process
protections must apply) from a private sphere (where the legislature,
26 Klare, supra note 17, at 1387.
271d.
28 Id. (emphasis added).
29 Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982).
30436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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not the courts, is responsible for defining appropriate procedures),
and finds the result inconsistent with the broadest implications of
Rehnquist's positivism. Professor Brest's more general message is
that the Hobbesian "positivist" version of liberal thought fails to
provide a coherent basis for the state action doctrine. For positivists,
Brest says, there can be no principled dichotomy because the state
itself creates the laws that define "private" rights: "since any private
action acquiesced in by the state can be seen to derive its power
from the state, which is free to withdraw its authorization at will,
positivism potentially implicates the state in every 'private' action
not prohibited by law."31 Therefore, everything collapses into the
policy issue of what laws best serve social needs. Under the natural
law version of liberalism (although not the focus of Brest's paper),
state action doctrine fares no better. Although natural law and
state action doctrine are "mutually sympathetic," 32 state action
doctrine "reflects and reinforces . .. a natural regime of property
rights" that is biased in favor of business.33  Brest suggests his con-
clusion about both branches of liberal theory as follows: "Because
it is not possible to specify the essence or scope of the government
function or the exclusivity with which it is performed with any
degree of specificity, the public function doctrine invites manipula-
tion." 14 Therefore, it would seem that for Professor Brest, as for
Professors Ellickson and Klare, there is no principled way to justify
a private realm.
III.
Now let us step back and see where we have been. In the
contemporary world of American politics, there appears to be a
consensus that there are spheres of activity within a "private" realm
where there should be a strong presumption against paternalistic
government regulation, and individuals should be free to decide
for themselves what to do. The disagreement is over which activi-
ties belong in' the public and private spheres. Liberal Democrats
and conservative Republicans both use the public/private dichotomy
to distinguish the legitimacy of governmental regulation in the
realm of sexual expression from the sphere involving the pursuit
of economic goods, but they would contradict each other in attach-
ing the labels to each set of activities. It's as if there were agree-
31 Brest, supra note 29, at 1301.
32 Id. 1300.
33 Id. 1330.
34 Id. 1329 (footnote omitted).
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ment that a river separates Manhattan from Brooklyn, but disagree-
ment about which borough is Manhattan and which is Brooklyn.
From my examination of three of the principal papers presented
at this symposium, however, I suggested that scholars are challeng-
ing the legitimacy of the dichotomy itself-the idea that there is a
sphere of private autonomy that the state should respect.
Now there is, of course, no necessity that one accept the liberal
tenet that there should be limits on the power of government vis-a-
vis the individual. Historical and comparative analyses in no way
suggest that the idea of a dichotomy between public and private
has been widely accepted. In a theocratic state-the Ayatollah's
Iran seems a contemporary example-there is no private realm, for
the state must enforce God's morality in all human interaction.
Other modern regimes premised on more secular ideologies also
reject the notion that there is a private sphere beyond the realm
of governmental control. In China, sexual morality is a matter of
public concern. Premarital intercourse is against the law; respon-
sible citizens are under an obligation to report an offending couple
to the authorities so that they can be brought in for thought reform.
Moreover, the family limitation program involves the authorities
in the sexual lives of married couples, who are permitted to have a
second child only if they agree either to be sterilized immediately
afterwards, or to have an abortion if there are any further concep-
tions. Forced abortions are used to discipline offenders. 35
The basic claim with which my talk began is that the public/
private dichotomy relates to fundamental questions of political
theory and moral philosophy. To what extent should individual
interests be subordinated to collective control? To what extent
should we have collective control over individual behavior? Are
there limits? What should they be? I repeat these questions, and
I address them particularly to those committed to rejecting the in-
tellectual tyranny of liberalism. Is your rejection total, or is your
disagreement really limited to the attempts to characterize economic
activities as private? Are you really closet liberals when the public/
private dichotomy is used to defend autonomy in the sexual realm?
35 1 learned about contemporary Chinese attitudes and practices from discus-
sions with Marjorie Wolf, a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Be-
havioral Sciences, who is presently completing a book on the role of women in
China. See also F. Bur-m~ , CorrA: ALvE N r TE Brrra SEA 227-28 (1982).
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